Political Regimes and Anti-Corruption Legislation in Africa: A Comparative Study with Kenya as a Benchmark

要旨

This study examines how regime type influences anti-corruption enforcement in Africa through a comparative analysis of Kenya, Rwanda, Nigeria, and South Africa, using qualitative process tracing and governance indicators including the Corruption Perceptions Index and Mo Ibrahim Index. Findings reveal that legal comprehensiveness does not guarantee effective enforcement: democratic regimes enact robust legislation but suffer from inconsistent enforcement due to elite capture, authoritarian regimes like Rwanda achieve stronger enforcement (CPI: 53/100) through centralized control but with political selectivity, while hybrid regimes like Kenya demonstrate the most fragmented patterns with comprehensive laws undermined by politicized implementation (CPI: 31/100). The study concludes that institutional autonomy and regime incentives, rather than legislative design alone, determine anti-corruption outcomes, highlighting the need to insulate enforcement mechanisms from political capture for sustainable reform.